Feeds:
Posts
Comments

Posts Tagged ‘United States’

chers,

a vous le billet de joe qui explique les adages porteurs de sectairianisme et de confessionalisme…..

a vous….

 

الطائفية في الأمثال الشعبية اللبنانية

قد يظن العديد منا أن الطائفية، كمنطق تفكير ومفهوم حياتيّ، أمرٌ مُستجد في مضمون تفكير وأقوال الشعب اللبناني، إلا أنه عند محاولة الاطلاع على مضمون الأمثال الشعبية اللبنانية القديمة، التي تعود الى مئات السنين نكتشف العكس.

لوحة لقرية في جبل لبنان

لوحة لقرية في جبل لبنان

إن الأمثال الشعبية لخير دليل على واقع شعبٍ معين، وعلى طريقة تفكيره وأفكاره الاجتماعية السياسية والثقافية والاقتصادية. فالأمثال نابعة من تجربة حيّة لأناس أطلقوها وشاعت لصِحتها، ولتطابقها مع آراء الناس العامة. وهذه الأمثال تسلط ضوء واضح على معرفة الهوية الحقيقية للناس الذي راجت بينهم. كما إن هذه الأمثال تساهم في تشكيل الوعي الجماعي من خلال عملية التراكم الثقافي والتاريخي. فالأمثال الشعبية ليست مجرد كلمات سهلة القول وفيها نوع من القافية، بل هي مرآة صادقة لتجارب تاريخية، فردية وجماعية، تفسر ما حدث وما يحدث على المستوى الفردي والجماعي.

ولبنان، كما غيره من الشعوب يَكثر في تاريخه الكثير من الأمثال التي لا يزال يستعملها قسم لا بأس به حتى اليوم وفيها الكثير من الأمثال التي تدل على واقع وإحساس طائفي عُبر عنه من خلال هذه الأمثال، وهذه بعضها، مع تفسير عنها قدر المستطاع لفهما:

–  اللّي أَخَد من غير مِلّتو مات بعلّتو.  ( وتعني أن الذي تزوج من غير طائفته، سيواجه مصاعب جمّة في حياته)

–  موراني وخَيّر؟ شي بـ حَيّر! (وتعني أن الماروني لا يمكن أن يكون خيراً ومعطاء، قد يكون المقصود بها أن الماروني بخيل)

–  البَدَوي إذا غسّلتو بـ يموت. ( البدوي، أو البدو، هي الصفة التي كان يطلقها المسيحيين في جبل لبنان على المسلمون، دلالةً منهم على أن المسلمون آتون من الصحراء وحضارة البدو، ودلالة على رائحتهم النتنة)

–  إذا كانت الكنافة بيدخّلا توم، الماروني بـيحب الروم. ( دليل على “الحب” القاتل بين الموارنة والروم الأرثوذكس)

–  الروم ما بيكسّر راسو القدوم. ( هذا دليل رؤية الآخرين على إن الروم الأرثوذكس هم متعصبون وكثيري العِناد)

–  جازة نصرانية: لا فرّاق الا بالخنّاق. (مثل يقوله المسلمون، إذ يعتبرون أن الزواج المسيحي لا ينتهي سوى بأن يقتل أحد الزوجان الآخر، لأن طلاق المتزوجين مسيحياً صعب وشبه ممنوع)

–  التِّركي ولا بكركي. (بكركي هي مقر البطريركية المارونية. حين أراد الموارنة إقامة دولة لبنان الكبير، ظهر هذا المَثل عند العديد من الطوائف الأخرى، رفضاً منهم للدولة ذات الغلبة المارونية وتفضيلهم الحكم العثماني عليها)

–  الخوري مارون ومن أميون! (بلدة أميون كان يسكنها الروم الأرثوذكس فقط، بينما اسم “مارون” هو خاص بالموارنة، فالمثل هذا مقصود به إلتقاء المستحيل)

–  صلّي عند الروم، وقدِّس عند الموارنة. (الصلاة عند الروم الأرثوذكس قصيرة بينما قداسهم طويل، أما الموارنة فالعكس)

–  صباح إبليس ولا صباح القسيس. صباح الشيطان ولا صباح الرهبان. صباح النوري ولا صباح الخوري. (هذه الأمثال الشعبية تقال عن رجال الدين المسيحيين)

–  رَيتو حمار الموراني يشخّ بديارك. ( كان طبيب ماروني من البترون يأتي إلى قرى منطقة الكورة على حماره ليعالج الناس الأرثوذكسيين هناك. هذا القول هو دعاء على الآخر لكي يَمرض. كما راجت أيضاً في مناطق الدروز من جبل لبنان الجنوبي، حيث كان الدروز الإقطاعيين يملكون الأحصنة بينما الفلاحون هم من الموارنة ولا يحق لهم ركب الأحصنة بل فقط الحمير)

– تعشّى عند الدرزي ونام عند المسيحي. (أصل المثل يعود الى صفة الغدر التي كان المسيحيون ينسبوها للدروز، وفي هذا المثل خوف من أن يطعن الدرزي ضيفه في الليل)

الأمثال إذاً، هي جزءٌ من حياة الشعوب وتاريخها، تتضمن الموروث التاريخي وتعبر عن مضامين الفكر والثقافة العامة. وهي صوت الشعب العادي، والأصدق، بعيداً عن زيف الخطابات الطنانة والكتب النظرية. بعد هذه اللمحة من الأمثال الطائفية الرائجة في حينها والتي لا يزال بعضها يُستعمل لليوم، لا نستطيع سوى أن نقول أن الطائفية في ما بين الشعوب التي شكلّت دولة لبنان لاحقاً يَغلب عليها الطابع الطائفي، الذي لم يكن نتيجة لأي شكل من أشكال الأنظمة السياسية اللاحقة، بل إن الطائفية هي بصلب الهوية المكونة للبنانيين.

يقول إبن عبدربه الأندلسي في كتابه العقد الفردي عن الأمثال: ” إن الأمثال أبقى من الشِعر وأشرق من الخِطابة”، يبدو أيضاً إن الطائفية هي أبقى عند اللبنانيين من كل مفهومٍ آخر.

***

المراجع:‏

أنيس فريحة، “معجم الأمثال اللبنانية الحديثة”

سعد الدين فروخ، “قاموس الأمثال البيروتية”

Read Full Post »

Finally, the draft law aiming to amend the Labor Law articles 28-29,  prepared by the NCLW, and submitted to the Lebanese Parliament by Member of Parliament and director of committees  Gilbert Zwein and Michel Moussa on 26/7/2011, was accepted by the lebanese government as a first step; Usually the Parliamentarian committees should discuss them, and vote the amendments, but as Nabih Berri Said and to foster cooperation between the Lebanese powers, he consulted the Government on that Issue;

the response of the governement was positive, maternity leave of women, needs to be extended to a period of ten weeks;

while waiting for the vote of the general assembly,

we can just applaud this positive step toward equality and women’s rights….

and dream, and act for a Paternity leave too!

Rita Chemaly

for more information please follow the article in al Akhbar

في جلسته الأخيرة، وافق مجلس الوزراء على اقتراحي قانون مقدّمين من النائبين جيلبرت زوين وميشال موسى، يقضيان برفع إجازة الأمومة من أربعين يوماً إلى عشرة أسابيع. قد يكون ما يحصل إنجازاً، لكنه سيبقى منقوصاً ما لم يدرس في اللجان النيابية، ويحُز موافقة المجلس النيابي من بعدها… ثم ينشر في الجريدة الرسمية

Read Full Post »

Un article de Elham Manea, politologue Yemenite a l’institut des sciences politiques de l’universite de Zurich, dans lequel elle retrace les changements survenus dans les relations tribales au Yemen.

 

Un  article qui a été publie dans le Daily Star Libanais le 6 avril 2012

rita chemaly

Tribalism in Yemen has changed deeply

February’s presidential election in Yemen by no means marks the end of the country’s troubles. However, the suggestion that the United States host a new arrangement based on decentralized negotiation between tribal and regional leaders is not the way to solve them.

Such a call ignores lessons from Yemen’s past and underestimates the deep changes that have taken place in Yemeni society over the last decades. Although the tribal system continues to operate as the prevalent mode of social organization, it is crucial to recognize that the nature of tribal networks and institutions has changed drastically.

Historically, tribal networks compensated for the state’s lack of capacity. The tribe assumed the role of protector and provider: securing tribal territory, protecting water wells, and resolving conflicts between its members or with other tribes. In many ways, the tribe was the institution of first resort for financial backing and social support in times of crisis. It is perhaps very telling that Aden – where the nuclear family has displaced the tribe as the main social unit – is more affected by poverty than regions that have preserved tribalism, such as Shabwah, Mahra and Al-Dali.

Tribal sheikhs were also once accountable to their constituents: They were elected and could be voted out. Thus, a sheikh was often regarded as a first among equals, rather than an absolute ruler. Custom (Irf) governed the mediation of conflict within or outside the tribe and could not be violated without loss of honor – a distinct disgrace – and threat of severe penalty.

However, the calculated politics of patronage applied by the former Yemeni president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, changed the nature of the relationship between tribal leaders and their constituencies. Saleh and the sheikhs had a number of incentives to engage in a new relationship. From the regime’s perspective, offering assistance to warring or otherwise weakened tribes undercut potentially strong alliances against it, and by incorporating tribal forms of arbitration, the regime also depleted tribal resources that could be used in opposition to the state. On the other side of the bargain, this patronage system afforded sheikhs freedom from accountability to their constituencies.

By successfully co-opting these leaders and rendering them dependent on Sanaa for privileges and largesse, Saleh’s patronage system eroded tribal codes and norms – ultimately leading to a leadership vacuum. Many sheikhs today are dramatically wealthier than their fellow tribesmen – and thus no longer dependent on their constituencies. More tribesmen are alienated from their leaders – who often take up residence in Sanaa and are only just beginning to abuse their power.

The most famous example is the case of the Jaashin area in Ibb, where the sheikh there evicted dozens of families in 2009 after they refused to pay “taxes” – they instead insisted on paying the municipalities directly. Additionally, there are reports of “private” prisons run by sheikhs who use them to intimidate and terrorize their own tribesmen – enough to cause Yemen’s Human Rights Minister Huriyya Mashhour to pledge to shut them down.

Saleh understood this reality belatedly. He mistakenly thought that securing the allegiance of sheikhs would ensure their tribes’ loyalties. But as was revealed in the uprisings that led to his removal from office, many tribe members did not follow the orders of their “leaders.” In this context, it is difficult to imagine how the United States would host a new arrangement based on decentralized negotiation with leaders who can no longer deliver.

Perhaps we should look to the Sultanate of Oman as a source of inspiration – particularly to its strategy used to integrate the region’s tribes and end the Dhofar Rebellion in the 1970s. Oman managed to overcome Dhofar’s isolation by connecting it to Muscat while simultaneously instilling a sense of national identity in its population through three major initiatives.

First, the government pardoned all the Dhofari fighters who were willing to switch sides: Those who accepted amnesty were retrained and incorporated into the armed forces. As a result, hundreds of Dhofari rebels deserted and joined Sultan Qaboos’ “Firqat” Irregulars. These squads ranged in size from 30 to 100 men, the majority of which were defected rebels and local tribesmen trained to operate as a paramilitary force.

Not only did this strategy help secure the support of the tribes from which members of the Firqat were drawn, but it also built up the squads as provisional regional governments, which may have helped rebuild trust in the central government. At the very least, this was a clear departure from previous policies of dispatching regular forces composed mostly of Pakistani soldiers.

The tribal factor was also especially important in Oman’s efforts to create an administrative network in the region and to ensure the allegiance of both tribal leaders and local people. Like the rest of the country at the time, Dhofar lacked a basic civil service. Starting in 1974, the new sultan set up several ministries to run Dhofar’s public affairs. And although the heads of these ministries lived in Muscat, local branches were set up for each, and their representatives were usually elected – rather than appointed – tribal leaders.

By addressing the economic and social demands and grievances of the population of Dhofar, the state aimed to undermine the very basis of the rebels’ cause. Between 1971 and 1975 the Omani government used generous funding from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to allocate 25 percent of the nation’s development budget to Dhofar alone and provide for the construction of local roads, airports, schools, clinics, and power stations. While promising to make the province economically self-sufficient by 1980, the overarching objective of the program was, however, to instill “pride in the community and a spirit of nation-building.” These efforts both appeased the Dhofari population and strengthened the connection between the center and the periphery.

All of this would not have been possible had the state been absent from the equation. The state is very much key to any attempt to solve Yemen’s problems, and hitherto has been hampered by weakness and corruption stemming from the rule of a single clan – one more interested in filling its coffers than addressing the needs of its population. But for this, we should not blame the state: Blame instead the leaders – and get to work.

Elham Manea is an associate professor at Zurich University’s Institute of Political Science. She specializes in Yemeni affairs and is the author of “Regional Politics in the Gulf” and “The Arab State and Women’s Rights: The Trap of Authoritarian Governance.” This commentary first appeared at Sada, an online journal published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
Read more: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/Opinion/Commentary/2012/Apr-06/169391-tribalism-in-yemen-has-changed-deeply.ashx#ixzz1sYwdmhu1

Read Full Post »

Today, Tuesday, April the 3rd 2012, the Jinsiyati Campaign in Lebanon, lobbying for women to be able to transmit their Lebanese nationality for their children and families,  is organising a Sit in in front of the Grand Serail( Saraya), Riad el Solh Square at 10:30 ( while the Council of Ministers is meeting) to ask the governmental Committee in charge of working on the nationality law to:

– Indicate a clear timeline within which the committee will be working and assume agreeing on the draft law;

– Share the Terms of Reference of the Committee (  what are their sources, what are their info);

– Include civil society organisations in the process of the discussions ( the importance of consulting civil society organisations campaigning and working on this right since more than 10 years is a must, they know the cases, the numbers, the obstacles and hindrances as well as the citizen’s expectations);

– and last but not least, take into consideration our demands for FULL CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS for women without any conditions ( women should transmit their nationality to their families, the Lebanese Constitution has clearly stipulated that all citizens are equal) ;

The banners of the peaceful collective action of today are clear:

Transmitting the nationality is a Right , this is not the Settlement of Palestinians,

Nationality is a right for women in the state of Rights and laws

the nationality law of 1925 is old and need to be amended ASAP!!!

Rita Chemaly,

The nationality law is so old that it is part of our "tourath"

N'enterrez pas la Loi sur la Nationalite dans un de vos tirroirs ou comites!

 

the woman's right to transmit her nationality is not naturalisation or settlement!

Read Full Post »

« Newer Posts

%d bloggers like this: